UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.	
10/709,522	05/11/2004	Krishna Mohan ITIKARLAPALLI	ORCL-003	3521	
51121 7590 07/13/2009 LAW FIRM OF NAREN THAPPETA C/o Landon-IP Inc., 1700 Diagonal Road, Suite 450			EXAMINER		
			SANDERS, AARON J		
Alexandria, VA			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER	
			2168		
			NOTIFICATION DATE	DELIVERY MODE	
			07/13/2009	ELECTRONIC	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es):

lfnt2000@yahoo.com oracle@iphorizons.com intercomm@iphorizons.com

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	
10/709,522	ITIKARLAPALLI ET AL.	
Examiner	Art Unit	

		7 VII COIT CAN BEING	2100	
	The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ears on the cover sheet with the	correspondence address	
THE R	EPLY FILED 29 June 2009 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APF	PLICATION IN CONDITION FOR A	LLOWANCE.	
á á f	The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must timely file one of the following application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appetor Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 Coeriods:	replies: (1) an amendment, affidavi eal (with appeal fee) in compliance	it, or other evidence, which places the with 37 CFR 41.31; or (3) a Request	è
a) [The period for reply expiresmonths from the mailing	g date of the final rejection.		
b) [2	no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire to Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (ater than SIX MONTHS from the mailing (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE	g date of the final rejection.	
have be under 3 set fortl may ree	MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(cons of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date sen filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of exity 7 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the solin in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later duce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). SEE OF APPEAL	on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.1 tension and the corresponding amount shortened statutory period for reply origing than three months after the mailing data.	of the fee. The appropriate extension fee inally set in the final Office action; or (2) as	S
2. 🔲 1 f	The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in compiling the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extendations of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed w	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the appeal. Since	
	<u>DMENTS</u>	·	、	
(The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, by They raise new issues that would require further core; b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE beloc) They are not deemed to place the application in bet	nsideration and/or search (see NO¯ vw);	TE below);	
(appeal; and/or d) ☐ They present additional claims without canceling a on NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).		ected claims.	
4. □	The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.11		mpliant Amendment (PTOL-324)	
	Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):		impliant Amendment (FTOL-324).	
	Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all		timely filed amendment canceling the	
r	on-allowable claim(s).		-	
 	For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) low the new or amended claims would be rejected is provine status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows: Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to: Claim(s) rejected: 1-10,13-21 and 25.		ll be entered and an explanation of	
	Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: AVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			
8. 🔲 7	The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, busecause applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).			
€	The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to o showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary	overcome <u>all</u> rejections under appea	al and/or appellant fails to provide a	
	The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation EST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER	n of the status of the claims after e	ntry is below or attached.	
	The request for reconsideration has been considered bu See Continuation Sheet.	t does NOT place the application in	n condition for allowance because:	
	Note the attached Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i> (s). (Other:	(PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)		
/Tim	T. Vo/			
	rvisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2168			

Continuation of 11. Request for reconsideration: The 35 U.S.C. 112 rejection of claims 7 and 10 has been withdrawn.

As per applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).

Here, although the examiner applied two different classes of prior art (referred to by applicant as C1 and C2, see Remarks filed April 29, 2009 p. 9), it would have been obvious to combine them for the reasons set forth in the previous Office action. It has been held that a prior art reference must either be in the field of applicant's endeavor or, if not, then be reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the applicant was concerned, in order to be relied upon as a basis for rejection of the claimed invention. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 24 USPQ2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Applicant's admitted prior art ("AAPA") provides the basis for the rejection. Gostanian and Lordi, despite being in a different class of prior art, each contain features it would have been desirable for AAPA to have.

Further, although there is undoubtedly a desire for "enhanced flexibility in implementing custom atomic transactions during the development of user programs" (Remarks p. 12), applicant has provided no evidence of a long felt need for the claimed method. Establishing long-felt need requires objective evidence that an art recognized problem existed in the art for a long period of time without solution. The relevance of long-felt need and the failure of others to the issue of obviousness depends on several factors. First, the need must have been a persistent one that was recognized by those of ordinary skill in the art. In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 539, 152 USPQ 602, 605 (CCPA 1967); Orthopedic Equipment Co., Inc. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 217 USPQ 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Second, the long-felt need must not have been satisfied by another before the invention by applicant. Newell Companies v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 768, 9 USPQ2d 1417, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Third, the invention must in fact satisfy the long-felt need. In re Cavanagh, 436 F.2d 491, 168 USPQ 466 (CCPA 1971).

Thus, the examiner has not employed impermissible hindsight in rejecting the claims under 35 U.S.C. 103.

As per applicant's argument that the references do not teach setting a variable to equal the transaction identifier, the examiner respectfully disagrees. The examiner has equated AAPA's "Account1()," the name of the transaction (Specification par. 23), to the transaction identifier. Combined with a reference that teaches setting a variable to equal a unique identifier, such as Lordi, "Account1()" would instead clearly be set, using a variable, to some unique identifier.

As per applicant's argument that Gostanian does not teach providing a transaction identifier to the user program, the examiner respectfully disagrees. Gostanian teaches at least providing the identifier to the cohorts, see Fig. 5, steps 526-530. Although AAPA's user program is comparable to Gostanian's application client, it is also comparable to the cohorts, since it executes the various procedures of the atomic transaction. Thus, it would have been obvious to provide the transaction identifier to the user program as claimed.

As per applicant's argument that the references do not teach aborting a transaction by specifying the identifier in the user program, the examiner respectfully disagrees. AAPA teaches aborting a transaction by specifying each procedure that makes up the transaction. Given Lordi's teaching of aborting transactions by specifying the transaction identifier instead, it would have been obvious to abort transactions in the user program using the transaction identifier instead of each procedure's identifier.

Thus, the 35 U.S.C. 103 rejections of claims 7 and the corresponding limitations of claim 10 are maintained.

Independent claims 1 and 16 do not include the limitations of claim 7 that applicant has addressed. Thus, the 35 U.S.C. 103 rejection of claims 1 and 16 is maintained.

2